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Abstract: This paper examines the hypothesis that violent crime causes gang membership. I
construct a theoretical model of the individual’s decision to join a gang based on the protection
that gang membership provides from violent crime. Using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1997 cohort and a probit specification, I test three different measures of the
threat of violent crime: a dummy variable for experiencing gun violence, a dummy variable for
being the victim of repeated bullying, and a dummy variable for being the victim of a violent
crime. In my regressions, I find support for the hypothesis that violent crime causes gang
membership. Each measure of violent crime is positive and highly statistically significant across
all of my regression specifications.
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I. Introduction
Gang activity is frequently covered by the media today as part of a number of growing urban
problems. As of 1970, 270 cities in the United States reported having problems with gangs (Miller 2001).
By 1998, the number of cities with gangs had increased to 2,547. Similarly, the number of counties
reporting gang problems rose from 101 in 1970 to 1,152 in 1998. As of 2008, the estimated number of
gangs in the United States was 26,500, for a total estimated 1 million gang members (Department of
Justice 2008 and Department of Justice 2009). Casual observation suggests that gangs are the source of
violence in their communities. For this reason they are specifically targeted by special law enforcement
units and millions of dollars have been spent on anti-gang programs nationwide (Department of Justice
2006).
This paper argues that the conventional wisdom that gangs cause violence is at most only half
the story. Rather than accepting that gangs are exogenous to violence, I test the hypothesis that violent
crime causes gang membership. I find support for this hypothesis. Each measure of violent crime is
positive and highly statistically significant across all of my regression specifications.
The next section of this paper reviews the economic literature on gangs. The third section
outlines a theoretical model of the gang membership decision. The fourth section provides a conceptual
model of gang membership and discusses my ideal data set. In the fifth section I discuss my actual data.
I analyze Probit regression results in the sixth section. I consider the robustness of my results in the
seventh section. The last section concludes with policy implications and describes directions for future
research.
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II. A Review of the Literature
II.I Economic Theory
Several theoretical models of gang formation appear in the economics of crime literature, based
on the idea that gangs form to earn financial rewards from crime. Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) develop
a theoretical model of extortion of productive enterprises by organized criminal gangs and consider how
police enforcement affects gang behavior. Their model shows that the main harm from extortion comes
from its distortion of investment decisions and that gangs may increase their criminal activity in
response to increased police intervention. Mansour et al. (2001) develop a theoretical model for the
formation of gangs as suppliers within black markets and examine the effects of crime deterrence on the
market structure within which gangs operate. Their model shows that as police attempt to shut down
suppliers in these black markets, the targeted gang splinters into competing units. This causes the black
market to transition from a monopoly to a competitive market, which leads to lower prices and higher
numbers of illegal goods sold. If violence is complementary to production, then police intervention will
result in more violence occurring. This model is particularly timely given the recent battles between
government troops and Mexican drug gangs (Grinberg 2009). Poutvaara and Priks (2007) develop a
model of criminal gangs in which gang leaders benefit financially from crime committed by gang
members. The gang leader faces a trade-off between the benefits of larger gangs and the benefits of
more violent crime. Changes in exogenous factors such as the unemployment rate can change the
optimal size of the gang from the gang leader’s point of view.
Other models in the literature examine non-financial incentives for gang formation. Vertinsky
(1999) applies the economics of information and organization to criminal street gangs and models gangs
as institutions for enforcing agreements. Essentially, criminals lack access to legal protection of their
contracts and property rights and must rely on gangs and violence to enforce agreements. She also
2

considers implications of her model for criminal law. Skaperdas (2001) and Kumar and Skaperdas (2008)
argue that gangs can be thought of as providing primitive state functions like protection. This model fits
well with other theoretical models of the private protection of property rights in the absence of state
institutions, like Dixit (2004). These models show that while gangs do provide protection for members,
their emerging monopoly on force also allows them to engage in extortion. This is very similar to the
behavior of other criminal organizations that provide protection services, such as the Mafia (Anderson
1995, Gambetta 1995, Varese 2001, Bandiera 2003, Hill 2006).

II.II Previous Empirical Research
Empirical research on gangs has focused on three issues: the functional role of gangs, the effects
of gangs, and the reasons individuals join gangs. Cook et al. (2005) analyze the role of gangs in
overcoming transaction costs in underground gun markets using data from Chicago gangs. By utilizing
reputational and relational mechanisms, gangs overcome the information asymmetry and search cost
problems in underground gun markets. They also find that many youths join gangs in order to gain
access to guns.
Skarbek (2008) focuses on a specific California-based prison gang and how it prevents predation
and misconduct within the gang using formal constitutional constraints. This system of institutionalized
rules constrains the behavior of gang leaders. He also finds that the prison gang uses a series of dispute
resolution mechanisms to reduce conflicts, which is important given that gang membership in this
particular gang is for life. Leeson (2007) and Leeson (2009) consider the similar problem of internal
predation among 17th and 18th century pirates. He highlights the use of a written constitution, along
with voting procedures, as an internal governance mechanism. The interesting finding in all of these
papers is that extra-governmental, criminal gangs have found a variety of ways to reduce conflict among
their own members.
3

Not all of the empirical evidence suggests that gangs reduce conflict. In contrast, Grogger (2002)
finds that civil gang injunctions in LA lead to a decline in violent crime by 5 – 10 percent in target areas
during the first year. This suggests that banning gang members from certain locations reduces violent
crime in those areas.
Mocan and Tekin (2006) investigate the effects of Catholic school attendance on the likelihood
that teenagers engage in illegal behaviors such as joining gangs, selling drugs, and committing property
crime using propensity score matching estimators. Their estimation method is intended to control for
the endogeneity of school choice. They find that attending a Catholic school significantly reduces the
propensity of males and females to join gangs.
Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) analyze the finances of a drug-selling gang in Chicago. They explain
gang participation using a tournament model, where gang members are competing to become the next
gang leader. Listokin (2005) uses Levitt and Venkatesh’s data set to test the hypothesis that gang
members are present oriented. This would imply that individuals join gangs because they heavily
discount future punishment. The results suggest that gang members are future oriented, given the
tournament wage structure.
Seals (2007) uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort and a logit specification
to determine if individuals join gangs when it is difficult to find a legitimate job. Among other controls,
he includes the serious crime rate for each individual’s county of residence, as well as dummies for
witnessing someone getting shot in the pre-survey period and being the victim of a bully before the age
of 12. Local labor market effects on gang participation are significant for individuals age sixteen and
above.
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Sobel and Osoba (2008) test the hypothesis that youth gangs form as protective associations
using monthly Los Angeles gang membership data obtained from the LAPD. They conduct granger
causality tests and find that homicides and aggravated assaults granger-cause gang membership, while
gang membership does not granger-cause violent crime. This is true even when the data is
disaggregated to differentiate the Crips, Bloods, and Hispanic gangs.
In addition to empirical evidence from the economic literature, there is also a large sociological
and criminological literature on gangs. In particular, there have been many studies based on
ethnographic interviews of gang members. What do gang members say are the reasons they joined a
gang? The two most common reasons are social reasons (i.e. to be with family or friends who are in a
gang) and protection from violence (Jankowski 1991, Padilla 1992, Klein 1995, Decker and Van Winkle
1996, Thornberry et al. 2003, and Peterson et al. 2004). Less frequently, gang members say they joined
in order to sell drugs or make money. Important for the protection model of gang membership, studies
find that few youths are coerced into gang membership and that it is possible to refuse to join a gang
without serious consequences (Decker and Kempf-Leonard 1991, Fleisher 1995, Fleisher 1998, and Freng
and Winfree 2004, Peterson et al. 2004). On the issue of exit costs, studies find that short-term and
marginal gang members can generally leave the gang costlessly, while long-term or core gang members
may encounter retaliation from the former gang or even rival gangs if they attempt to leave (Decker and
Van Winkle 1996, Decker and Lauritsen 2002). Moving away may be the lowest cost option in these
circumstances.
This paper’s contribution to the literature is two-fold. First, I construct a theoretical model of the
individual’s decision to join a gang based on the protection that gang membership provides from violent
crime. Second, I run various probit regressions using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997
cohort to see if having been the victim of a violent crime causes individuals to join gangs. This is an
5

improvement since Sobel and Osoba (2008) did not use individual level data, and Seals (2007) did not
include any measures of survey period violence in his sample. I use three measures of violence: the
lagged value of a dummy variable for experiencing gun violence (like witnessing someone getting shot),
the lagged value of a dummy variable for being the victim of repeated bullying, and the lagged value of a
dummy variable for being a victim of violent crime. I also use a more complete set of control variables
than any paper in the literature. For example, Seals (2007) did not control for variables that the
literature suggests are important, such as knowing someone in a gang or selling drugs.

III. Theoretical Model
In this economic model, an agent’s utility function is assumed to be twice continuously
differentiable and represents a continuous, locally nonsatiated, strictly convex preference relation.
Agents are assumed to have an endowment of time (t) in hours, with 0 < t ≤ 24. An agent’s utility (U) is
assumed to be a function of two things: consumption and feeling secure. Consumption (C) is equal to
the wage (w) multiplied by the number of hours worked. I assume

డ
డ

> 0. Feeling secure (F) is a

function of two things: the frequency of violent crime (V), and gang membership (M). The time spent in
a gang is either 0 or some constant g, where 0 < g < t1. I assume
assume
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≥ 0, and డ < 0. I also

> 0, which implies that there is a complementarity between violent crime and gang

membership2. This means that as the frequency of violent crime increases, the contribution of gang
membership to feeling secure increases. The last assumption is
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= 0 if V = 0. This means that

1

I ignore the intensive margin of gang membership, since I only observe the extensive margin in my data. Here I
also implicitly assume that exiting the gang is costless. This should be reasonable for short-term gang members,
which constitute most of the gang members in my data. If gang exit is costly, a more appropriate model would be
one based on rational addiction (Becker and Murphy 1988).

2

Alternatively, drop this assumption. The utility maximization results will then be ambiguous regarding the agent’s
choice. Thus, my regression results can be viewed as estimating the sign of this second derivative.

6

membership in a gang does not make the agent feel any more secure if the frequency of violent crime is
zero.
Since the agent’s utility function represents a locally nonsatiated preference relation, a utility
maximizing agent will not leave any time left unused. Thus, there are only two possible utility
maximizing choices. Either the agent will spend all of his time working, or he will join a gang and spend
the remaining amount of time working. To see how the frequency of violent crime affects this choice,
first assume that there is no violent crime. By the last assumption, gang membership does not make the
agent feel more secure. The agent is thus choosing between two bundles: one contains consumption of
w*t and some feeling of security (F1), the other contains consumption of w*(t-g) and F1. The agent will
thus maximize utility by choosing not to join a gang. Now consider a situation where there is some
frequency of violent crime (V > 0). The agent now has a choice between two bundles: one contains
consumption of w*t and some feeling of security (F2), the other contains consumption of w*(t-g) and an
డி

amount of feeling secure equal to F2 + డெ . The agent’s utility maximizing choice of bundle depends on
the agent’s preferences. Specifically, it depends on whether the agent prefers consumption of w*g or
feeling more secure by

డி
.
డெ

Consider what happens as the frequency of violence increases, holding all

else constant. The cost of choosing to join a gang, w*g remains the same. As V increases, F2 decreases
డி

and డெ increases. Thus, the benefit of joining a gang increases. This leads to my theoretical prediction:
as violent crime increases, more people will choose to join a gang.

IV. Conceptual Model
At a more conceptual level, gang membership = f(social networks, threat of violence, interest in
selling drugs, opportunity cost of membership). Knowing people in a gang and having an interest in
selling drugs constitute the non-security related utility of gang membership. These variables have been
7

identified as important in the ethnographic interview literature. The threat of violence was previously
discussed in the theoretical model. The opportunity cost of gang membership has generally been
identified in the economic literature as foregone employment opportunities.
To test the theory, one should use very detailed individual level panel data. Ideally, I would
observe each individual’s opportunity cost of joining a gang (i.e. foregone wages), the number of people
each individual knows in a gang, and their fear of being a victim of violent crime (a probability
estimate). Controlling for the costs and the non-security related utility of gang membership, as each
individual's fear of being a victim of violent crime increases, their probability of joining a gang should
increase.

V. Actual Data
To test my theory, I use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort. It
follows youths born between 1980 and 1984, and the survey is designed to be a representative sample
of the youth population aged 12-16 in the US in 1997. It is collected annually (from 1997 through 2006)
and contains a variety of individual and family characteristics, as well as variables measuring
educational, criminal, and labor market outcomes. It is a very common microeconometrics dataset.
In the NLSY97, a gang is defined as "a group that hangs out together, wears gang colors or
clothes, has set clear boundaries of its territory or turf, and protects its members and turf against other
rival gangs through fighting or threats". These are not highly organized drug-selling gangs, they are not
gangs exclusively organized around other monetary incentives (i.e. extortion), they do not operate
internationally, nor are they prison gangs. These are youth gangs, of the type found in high schools and
urban neighborhoods (though not exclusively). Note that protection for members is part of the
definition of a gang.
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Summary statistics from the NLSY97 data are shown in table 1. Any individual with missing
values in the original survey was dropped. My data set consists of a total of 38,114 observations for the
period 1997-2005. There are 548 observations of gang members in the data set. Although about half the
data set is male, the sample of gang members is approximately 75% male. Gang members are also more
likely to be Black or Hispanic and are more likely to live in an urban area than non-gang members. Gang
members tend to be younger and have completed less education relative to the rest of the sample.
Gang members also have lower cognitive ability than non-gang members, as measured by the Armed
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test3. Gang members tend to come from families with
lower household incomes. Gang members are much more active in selling drugs than non-gang
members, and are more likely to carry around guns. Gang members are much more likely to have a
friend or relative in a gang. It is not surprising that gang members are much more likely to experience
gun violence. They are more likely to be a victim of repeated bullying, but not a victim of a violent crime.

3

The ASVAB score is a percentile score for specific age cohorts based upon four components of the ASVAB which
attempts to measure mathematical and verbal ability. The ASVAB is similar to the Armed Forces Qualification Test
(AFQT).
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Table 1
Summary Statistics
Full-Sample
Gang Members

Non-Gang Members

Gang
Member
Sex

0.014 (0.119)

--

--

0.495 (0.500)

0.763 (0.426)

0.491 (0.500)

Black

0.228 (0.420)

0.350 (0.477)

0.226 (0.418)

Hispanic

0.174 (0.379)

0.274 (0.446)

0.172 (0.378)

Lives in
suburban
area

0.496 (0.500)

0.370 (0.483)

0.498 (0.500)

Lives in
urban area

0.322 (0.467)

0.421 (0.494)

0.320 (0.467)

Highest
grade
completed

11.289 (2.506)

9.536 (1.829)

11.315 (2.506)

Age

18.376 (2.741)

17.027 (2.281)

18.395 (2.741)

Household
Income

55750.87 (54881.44)

34096.12 (36176.34)

56066.76 (55044.65)

Number of
times sold
drugs in last
year?

1.696 (22.487)

18.491 (82.276)

1.450 (20.267)

Number of
times carried
gun in last
30 days?

0.236 (2.175)

2.701 (7.034)

0.199 (1.993)

Friend in a
Gang?

0.091 (0.288)

0.682 (0.466)

0.082 (0.274)

ASVAB Score

49.722 (29.281)

28.962 (25.522)

50.025 (29.223)

Gun
Violence*

0.031 (0.173)

0.202 (0.402)

0.028 (0.166)

Bullying
Victim*

0.033 (0.180)

0.060 (0.238)

0.033 (0.178)

Violent
0.011 (0.103)
0.011 (0.105)
0.011 (0.103)
Crime
Victim*
Note: Sample contains 38,114 observations with 548 Gang members. All variables are dummy variables except
Highest-grade completed, Age, Household income, Number of times sold drugs, Number of times carried gun, and
ASVAB score. Means are shown with standard deviations in parentheses. *Summary statistics for gun violence,
bullying victim, and violent crime victim reflect the 26,715 observations, the 27,024 observations, and the 33,292
observations without missing data for these questions, respectively.
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VI. Actual Model and Results
I will test my theoretical prediction by estimating the following equation:

Gangi,t =β1 + β2θ i + β3χi,t + β4σ i,t-1 + β5δi + β6Ω i,t + β7λi,t + β8ρi,t-1 + εi,t
where Gangi,t is an indicator for current gang membership. I will therefore estimate this equation with a
probit functional form. θ is a vector of individual i's time-invariant characteristics. These characteristics
include ASVAB score, race, and gender.

χ is a vector of individual i’s characteristics at time t. These

characteristics include age, age-squared, citizenship status, highest-grade completed in school, and
enrollment in school. σ is a vector of individual i’s characteristics at time t-1. These include having a job,
serving time in a correctional facility (such as a jail, prison, or juvenile detention facility), frequency of
drug selling in the past year, frequency of carrying a gun in the past 30 days, gang membership, and
knowing a friend or relative in a gang. δ is a vector of individual i’s time-invariant family characteristics.
These are dummies for each parent's level of education, and an indicator for the presence of the father
during the first survey period.

Ω

is a vector of individual i’s family characteristics at time t. These

characteristics include household income and number of children in the household. λ is a vector of the
characteristics of individual i’s location at time t. These include regional dummies, Metropolitan
Statistical Area (urban, suburban, and rural dummies), and the regional unemployment rate. ρ is a

measure of violent crime experienced by individual i at time t-1. εi,t is a standard normal error
term. Economic theory predicts that the sign on β8 will be positive.

There are two estimation issues with the above regression equation. Pairwise correlation
coefficients suggest multicollinearity between age, age-squared, and highest-grade completed. I leave it
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uncorrected. Additional problems arise from the lagged dependent variable. In many areas of
microeconometrics, a lagged dependent variable is often included in a binary dependent variable model
in order to test for state dependence4. A lagged dependent variable can also proxy for unobserved
factors whose omission would bias estimation. However, this leads to the initial conditions problem. In
my model, if the initial assignment of gang membership is not exogenous but is correlated with
unobserved heterogeneity, then potentially spurious state dependence can be found5. This means that
the estimates of the effect of the lagged dependent variable may be biased upwards. However, the bias
does decrease with the length of the panel.
The first regression equation I estimate is the following Probit regression equation:
Regression 1 (Probit): φ-1(P) = α + β1(Individual Characteristics) + β2(Family Characteristics) + β3(Gang
Membershipt-1) + β4(Shott-1) + Additional Controls

Where: P is the probability of Gang membership being one, φ-1 is the inverse of the normal cumulative
distribution function, Shot is a dummy variable for experiencing gun violence (like witnessing someone
getting shot), and all of the other variables are defined as above. The results of Regression 1 are
displayed in Table 2.

4

See Chay and Hyslop (2000), Arellano and Carrasco (2003), and Halliday (2006).

5

One way to solve this problem is to use pre-sample characteristics to instrument for the initial conditions. This is
the fortuitous case of selection on observables.
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Table 2 - Current Gang Membership Pooled Probit Regression Results
Dependent variable is Current Gang
Membership Status (0 or 1)
Independent Variables
Male
Age
Age-Squared
ASVAB
Regional Unemployment Rate
Household Income (in thousands of
dollars)
L(Have a job?)
L(Went to a correctional facility?)
L(Number of times sold drugs last
year)
L(Number of times carried a gun in last
30 days)
L(Friend in a Gang?)
L(Gang Membership)
L(Shot)
L(Bully)
L(Victim of Violent Crime)
Intercept
Number of Observations
Pseudo-R2
Log likelihood
Likelihood Ratio
Prob > Chi2

Regression 1
Pooled Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

Regression 2
Pooled Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

Regression 3
Pooled Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

0.363 (6.11)***
0.122 (0.52)
-0.003 (-0.42)
-0.004 (-3.15)***
0.239 (1.49)
-0.002 (-2.71)***

0.471 (8.41)***
0.103 (0.47)
-0.003 (-0.44)
-0.003 (-2.67)***
0.085 (0.56)
-0.002 (-2.94)***

0.452 (8.78)***
0.131 (0.71)
-0.004 (-0.75)
-0.004 (-4.27)***
0.089 (0.65)
-0.001 (-2.23)**

-0.086 (-1.43)
0.370 (2.47)**
0.001 (1.41)

-0.098 (-1.82)*
0.198 (1.41)
0.001 (2.34)**

-0.109 (-2.20)**
0.147 (1.09)
0.001 (2.47)**

0.016 (2.06)**

0.020 (3.41)***

0.018 (3.30)***

0.542 (8.92)***
1.304 (15.59)***
0.426 (4.54)***
-------------7.496 (-2.53)**
26715
0.296
-1186.240
chi2(71) = 997.99
0.0000

0.534 (9.66)***
1.375 (18.79)***
------0.317 (2.91)***
-------6.657 (-2.65)***
27024
0.308
-1466.104
chi2(71) = 1307.62
0.0000

0.557 (10.94)***
1.378 (20.43)***
------------0.707 (5.10)***
-6.723 (-2.56)**
33292
0.314
-1720.637
chi2(71) = 1573.04
0.0000

Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; Additional controls in each regression include: number of children
in the household, race dummies, citizenship status dummies, region dummies, MSA dummies, time dummies, MSA
and time interactions, school enrollment dummy, dummies for each parent's level of education, dummies for
highest grade completed, and dummy for presence of father in first survey period.

With Regression 1, I find a positive coefficient on the lagged value of experiencing gun violence,
as predicted by theory. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on
being male, knowing a friend or relative in a gang, and gang membership last year are all positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficients on the number of times carried a gun and having
been in a correctional facility are both positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. The
coefficient on number of times sold drugs is positive but not significant. Household income and ASVAB
13

score both negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on age is positive while
the coefficient on age-squared is negative, suggesting that as individuals get older they are more likely
to join a gang (with the effect diminishing and then reversing over time). However, neither coefficient is
significant. The coefficient on the regional unemployment rate is positive but not significant. The
coefficient on having a job is negative but not significant.
I next estimate the following Probit equation:
Regression 2 (Probit): φ-1(P) = α + β1(Individual Characteristics) + β2(Family Characteristics) + β3(Gang
Membershipt-1) + β4(Bullyt-1) + Additional Controls

Where: P is the probability of Gang Membership being one, Bully is a dummy variable for being the
victim of repeated bullying, and all of the other variables are defined as previously. The results of
Regression 2 are displayed in Table 2.
With Regression 2, I find a positive coefficient on the lagged value of experiencing repeated
bulling, as predicted by theory. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the
regression results are very similar. In this regression, the number of times carried a gun is statistically
significant at the 1% level and the number of times sold drugs is significant at the 5% level. The
coefficient on having a job is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, while the coefficient
on having been in a correctional facility is no longer statistically significant.
I then estimate the following Probit equation:
Regression 3 (Probit): φ-1(P) = α + β1(Individual Characteristics) + β2(Family Characteristics) + β3(Gang
Membershipt-1) + β4(Victimt-1) + Additional Controls
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Where: P is the probability of Gang Membership being one, Victim is a dummy variable for being the
victim of a violent crime, and all of the other variables are defined as previously. The results of
Regression 3 are displayed in Table 2.
With Regression 3, I find a positive coefficient on the lagged value of being the victim of a
violent crime, as predicted by theory. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level. The rest
of the regression results are very similar to those of regression 2. The only changes are that household
income is now only significant at the 5% level and having a job is now significant at the 5% level.
The marginal effects from regressions 1, 2, and 3 are shown in Table 3. They are calculated at
the means of the covariates. Across regressions, the results mean that the probability impact of prior
gang membership is between 6.9% and 9.5%. The probability impact of knowing someone in a gang is
between 0.9% and 1.2%. For an individual with average characteristics, being exposed to gun violence
raises the probability of being in a gang in the next period by 0.7%. Being the victim of repeated bullying
raises the probability of being in a gang in the next period by 0.6%. Finally, being the victim of a violent
crime raises the probability of being in a gang in the next period by 2.0%. These results are all
statistically significant at the 1% level, except being the victim of repeated bullying, which is statistically
significant at the 5% level.
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Table 3 - Current Gang Membership Pooled Probit Marginal Effects
Dependent variable is Current Gang
Membership Status (0 or 1)
Independent Variables
Male
Age
Age-Squared
ASVAB
Regional Unemployment Rate
Household Income (in thousands of
dollars)
L(Have a job?)
L(Went to a correctional facility?)
L(Number of times sold drugs last
year)
L(Number of times carried a gun in last
30 days)
L(Friend in a Gang?)
L(Gang Membership)
L(Shot)
L(Bully)
L(Victim of Violent Crime)

Regression 1
Pooled Probit
Marginal Effect (Zstatistic)

Regression 2
Pooled Probit
Marginal Effect (Zstatistic)

Regression 3
Pooled Probit
Marginal Effect (Zstatistic)

0.003 (5.35)***
0.001 (0.52)
-0.00003 (-0.42)
-0.00004 (-3.06)***
0.002 (1.48)
-0.00002 (-2.74)***

0.006 (7.37)***
0.001 (0.47)
-0.00003 (-0.44)
-0.00004 (-2.63)***
0.001 (0.56)
-0.00003 (-2.98)***

0.005 (7.54)***
0.001 (0.71)
-0.00004 (-0.75)
-0.00005 (-4.14)***
0.001 (0.64)
-0.00002 (-2.23)**

-0.001 (-1.35)
0.006 (1.60)
0.00001 (1.39)

-0.001 (-1.72)*
0.003 (1.11)
0.00002 (2.29)**

-0.001 (-2.04)**
0.002 (0.91)
0.00002 (2.43)**

0.0001 (2.00)**

0.0002 (3.23)***

0.0002 (3.14)***

0.009 (5.18)***
0.069 (5.62)***
0.007 (2.80)***
-------------

0.012 (5.88)***
0.095 (7.04)***
------0.006 (2.06)**
-------

0.011 (6.35)***
0.089 (7.43)***
------------0.020 (2.62)***

Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; Additional controls in each regression include: number of children
in the household, race dummies, citizenship status dummies, region dummies, MSA dummies, time dummies, MSA
and time interactions, school enrollment dummy, dummies for each parent's level of education, dummies for
highest grade completed, and dummy for presence of father in first survey period; Marginal effects are calculated
at the means of the covariates.

Tables 4, 5, and 6 characterize the accuracy of regressions 1, 2, and 3. Regression 1 correctly
predicts 22 of the 309 gang members and 26385 of the 26406 non-gang members. The model’s
prediction slightly beats a naïve rule of predicting all 0’s. Regression 2 correctly predicts 42 of the 409
gang members and 26578 of the 26615 non-gang members. Again, the model’s prediction slightly beats
a naïve rule of predicting all 0’s. Regression 3 correctly predicts 52 of the 479 gang members and 32764
of the 32813 non-gang members. As before, the model’s prediction slightly beats a naïve rule of
predicting all 0’s.
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Table 4 – Investigation of Regression 1
True

True

Classified

D

~D

Total

+

22

21

43

_

287

26385

26672

Total

309

26406

26715

Notes: Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5, True D defined as Gang Member = 1, Correctly classified 98.85%, Naive
Rule of all 0's correctly classifies 98.84%

Table 5 – Investigation of Regression 2
True

True

Classified

D

~D

Total

+

42

37

79

_

367

26578

26945

Total

409

26615

27024

Notes: Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5, True D defined as Gang Member = 1, Correctly classified 98.51%, Naive
Rule of all 0's correctly classifies 98.49%
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Table 6 – Investigation of Regression 3
True

True

Classified

D

~D

Total

+

52

49

101

_

427

32764

33191

Total

479

32813

33292

Notes: Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .5, True D defined as Gang Member = 1, Correctly classified 98.57%, Naive
Rule of all 0's correctly classifies 98.56%

Figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 plot the residuals from Regression 3. Figure 1 plots the residuals vs. age.
The plot shows the individuals for which the model over- and under-predicts gang membership. The
residuals are largest in the middle of the age distribution. Figure 2 plots the residuals vs. ASVAB score.
The plot shows that the model is missing (both under- and over-predicting) individuals at low ASVAB
scores. Figure 3 plots the residuals vs. household income. As can be seen in the figure, the model does a
good job of predicting individuals whose household income is high. The largest residuals are at low
household income levels. Figure 4 plots the residuals vs. the number of times an individual sold drugs
last year. The largest residuals occur at low levels of drug sales. Figure 5 plots the residuals vs. the
number of times an individual carried a gun in the last 30 days. The residuals are largest on the two tails.
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Figure 1: Residuals vs. Age

Figure 2: Residuals vs. ASVAB Score
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Figure 3: Residuals vs. Household Income

Figure 4: Residuals vs. Number of Times Sold Drugs in Last Year
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Figure 5: Residuals vs. Number of Times Carried Gun in Last 30 Days

Figure 6 graphs the estimated probability of gang membership vs. ASVAB score using the
estimates from regression 3. The blue line is the probit estimate of the probability of being a gang
member as the individual’s ASVAB score, when the individual was not the victim of violent crime last
period and all other covariates are taken to be at their mean values. The orange line is the probability of
being a gang member when the individual was the victim of violent crime last period, with all other
covariates taken to be at their mean values. Each line is surrounded by a 95% confidence interval. The
graph thus shows the difference in the probability of being a gang member because of violent crime. As
can be seen in the figure, at its highest, being the victim of a violent crime raises the probability of
joining a gang by 3%. This is about a 5 times higher probability of being a gang member. The impact is
certainly statistically different from zero at all ASVAB scores. Figures 7, 8, and 9 graph the probability of
gang membership vs. household income, the number of times carried a gun in last 30 days, and the
21

number of times sold drugs in last year, respectively. In Figure 7, being the victim of a violent crime
raises the probability of being a gang member by at most 2%. This is again about a 5 times higher
probability of gang membership. The confidence intervals show that the impact of being a victim of
violent crime is not statistically different from zero at household incomes above approximately
$330,000. Figure 8 shows the impact of being a victim of violent crime on the probability of being a gang
member to be about 5%. This is about a 6 times higher probability that if the individual was not a victim
of violent crime. The effect is statistically different from zero at all levels of carrying a gun. In Figure 9,
the probability impact on gang membership of being a victim of violent crime is at most 20%. This is
about a 3 times higher probability than when the individual was not a victim of a violent crime. The
confidence intervals show that the impact is not statistically different from zero when the individual sold
drugs more than 800 times a year.
Figure 6: Probability of Gang Membership vs. ASVAB Score
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Figure 7: Probability of Gang Membership vs. Household Income

Figure 8: Probability of Gang Membership vs. Number of Times Carried A Gun In Last 30 Days
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Figure 9: Probability of Gang Membership vs. Number of Times Sold Drugs In Last Year

VII. Robustness
To determine the robustness of my regression results, I completed four different procedures.
First, I re-ran the regressions while restricting my sample to only those individuals living in an urban
area. The overall regression results, including the results for the measures of violent crime, were very
close to the original results.
Second, I ran regressions 1, 2, and 3 using random effects panel probit instead of pooled probit.
The results are given in Table 7. The results are very similar to the original pooled probit results. In
regression 4, the changes include the regional unemployment rate being statistically significant at the
10% level and having gone to a correctional facility during the year being now statistically significant at
the 5% level. The coefficient on exposure to gun violence is a little larger than previously, but still
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positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Regressions 5 and 6 look very similar to Regressions
2 and 3. The measures of violence are still positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.
Third, I used Propensity Score Matching as an alternative way to estimate the treatment effect
of being a victim of violent crime on gang membership. The propensity score was estimated using only
regional dummies and year dummies. This specification had as much predictive power as much fuller
specifications and yielded nearly the same results. However, none of the possible specifications had a
Pseudo-R2 that exceeded 0.08. Keeping that in mind, I estimated the treatment effect using the
stratification method. The average treatment effect was estimated to be 0.012 with a bootstrapped
standard error of 0.005 (using 1000 repetitions) and a t-statistic of 2.270. This treatment effect is a little
larger than the estimated marginal effects of experiencing gun violence or repeated bullying, but is a
little smaller than the estimated marginal effect of being a victim of violent crime. This suggests that in
my original regressions there is minimal bias from non-random selection (due to unobserved
heterogeneity) into being a victim of violent crime.
Finally, I generated a dummy variable for joining a gang during the year. The variable is only a 1
if the individual joined a gang (is in a gang at time t, but was not in a gang at time t-1), and is 0
otherwise. I then re-ran Regressions 1, 2, and 3 using this new variable as the independent variable. I no
longer included lagged gang membership in the regressions. The results are given in Table 8. The results
are very similar to the original results. All of the measures of violence are positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level, except bullying which is significant at the 5% level.
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Table 7 - Current Gang Membership Random Effects Panel Probit Regression Results
Dependent variable is Current Gang
Membership Status (0 or 1)
Independent Variables

Male
Age
Age-Squared
ASVAB
Regional Unemployment Rate
Household Income (in thousands of
dollars)
L(Have a job?)
L(Went to a correctional facility?)
L(Number of times sold drugs last
year)
L(Number of times carried a gun in last
30 days)
L(Friend in a Gang?)
L(Gang Membership)
L(Shot)
L(Bully)
L(Victim of Violent Crime)
Intercept
Number of Observations
Log likelihood
Wald Chi2
Prob > Chi2
(LR Test rho=0) Chibar2(01)
Prob > Chibar2

Regression 1
Random Effects
Panel Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

Regression 2
Random Effects
Panel Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

Regression 3
Random Effects
Panel Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

0.411 (5.62)***
0.033 (0.13)
-0.001 (-0.13)
-0.005 (-3.64)***
0.297 (1.67)*
-0.003 (-2.46)**

0.517 (7.63)***
0.092 (0.39)
-0.003 (-0.40)
-0.004 (-2.96)***
0.117 (0.71)
-0.002 (-2.72)***

0.509 (7.69)***
0.091 (0.44)
-0.003 (-0.55)
-0.006 (-4.50)***
0.118 (0.76)
-0.001 (-1.72)*

-0.081 (-1.18)
0.371 (2.09)**
0.001 (1.50)

-0.098 (-1.63)
0.187 (1.14)
0.001 (2.07)**

-0.110 (-1.91)*
0.164 (1.02)
0.001 (1.93)*

0.019 (2.02)**

0.024 (3.52)***

0.023 (3.50)***

0.588 (8.32)***
1.146 (10.97)***
0.525 (4.74)***
-------------2.752 (-1.18)
26715
-1098.190
chi2(71) = 608.52
0.0000
17.63
0.0000

0.578 (9.09)***
1.209 (12.60)***
------0.360 (2.93)***
-------2.475 (-1.14)
27024
-1353.777
chi2(71) = 762.76
0.0000
16.46
0.0000

0.611 (10.06)***
1.103 (11.71)***
------------0.741 (4.54)***
-2.473 (-1.29)
33292
-1581.041
chi2(71) = 806.67
0.0000
37.08
0.0000

Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; Additional controls in each regression include: number of children
in the household, race dummies, citizenship status dummies, region dummies, MSA dummies, time dummies, MSA
and time interactions, school enrollment dummy, dummies for each parent's level of education, dummies for
highest grade completed, and dummy for presence of father in first survey period.
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Table 8 - Joining A Gang Pooled Probit Regression Results
Dependent variable is Joining A Gang
During The Year (0 or 1)
Independent Variables
Male
Age
Age-Squared
ASVAB
Regional Unemployment Rate
Household Income (in thousands of
dollars)
L(Have a job?)
L(Went to a correctional facility?)
L(Number of times sold drugs last
year)
L(Number of times carried a gun in last
30 days)
L(Friend in a Gang?)
L(Shot)
L(Bully)
L(Victim of Violent Crime)
Intercept
Number of Observations
Pseudo-R2
Log likelihood
Likelihood Ratio
Prob > Chi2

Regression 1
Pooled Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

Regression 2
Pooled Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

Regression 3
Pooled Probit
Coefficient (Zstatistic)

0.355 (5.59)***
0.195 (0.78)
-0.005 (-0.68)
-0.004 (-2.97)***
0.251 (1.45)
-0.002 (-2.30)**

0.438 (7.40)***
0.166 (0.71)
-0.004 (-0.66)
-0.003 (-2.71)***
0.091 (0.56)
-0.002 (-2.61)***

0.425 (7.77)***
0.145 (0.74)
-0.004 (-0.77)
-0.005 (-4.38)***
0.075 (0.50)
-0.001 (-1.91)*

-0.064 (-0.97)
0.101 (0.52)
0.001 (1.36)

-0.085 (-1.47)
0.005 (0.03)
0.001 (2.32)**

-0.108 (-2.01)**
-0.071 (-0.41)
0.001 (2.35)**

0.014 (1.59)

0.018 (2.66)***

0.014 (2.19)**

0.581 (9.08)***
0.393 (3.80)***
-------------8.193 (-2.67)***
26715
0.169
-987.552
chi2(70) = 401.76
0.0000

0.538 (9.20)***
------0.236 (1.96)**
-------7.361 (-2.44)**
27024
0.154
-1205.489
chi2(70) = 438.84
0.0000

0.576 (10.69)***
------------0.777 (5.52)***
-6.956 (-2.78)***
33292
0.168
-1408.467
chi2(70) = 569.58
0.0000

Notes: * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level; ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level; ***
denotes statistical significance at the 1% level; Additional controls in each regression include: number of children
in the household, race dummies, citizenship status dummies, region dummies, MSA dummies, time dummies, MSA
and time interactions, school enrollment dummy, dummies for each parent's level of education, dummies for
highest grade completed, and dummy for presence of father in first survey period.

VIII. Conclusion
This paper examines the link between violent crime and gang membership. I test the hypothesis
that violent crime causes gang membership. I find support for this hypothesis. Each measure of violent
crime is positive and highly statistically significant across all of my regression specifications.
One limitation to this paper is that the unemployment rate is at the regional level instead of the
county level. I was unable to obtain the county level data since it is not public access data. A prior study
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has shown that the county level unemployment rate is important in determining gang membership and I
expect that my estimates of the effect of being a victim of violent crime would be larger if I used county
level unemployment data.
My results imply that simply targeting gangs with law enforcement initiatives will not solve the
problem. Since it has been shown that violence causes gang membership, and evidence suggests that
more gang members leads to more violence, the results imply that there exists a positive feedback
effect between violence and gang membership which should lead to a spiraling upwards towards a high
gang membership equilibrium. This is consistent with the dramatic increase in gangs that has been
observed in the past 30 years. In order to reduce the problem of gangs, the cycle of violence needs to be
addressed. To the extent that this violence originates in schools, perhaps school choice initiatives (like
vouchers) may be a way to better secure student safety. See Walberg (2007). Maybe more innovative
proposals are needed, such as the privatization of neighborhood services and residential streets as in St.
Louis and University City, Missouri and Laredo, Texas. By restricting non-resident access to streets and
providing security, these measures lowered crime rates. See Foldvary (1994), Thompson and Green
(1998), Benson (1998), Beito (2002), and Foldvary (2006).
Future research should address my limitations and explore the quantifiable aspects of the public
policy implications. From a cost-benefit perspective, addressing the safety concerns of gang and
community members might be a way to build more police-community cooperation and reduce gang
activity. At the very least, my results suggest that the rational choice approach to modeling gang
membership has explanatory power.
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